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In this Introduction to the Special Topic Forum on Management Theory and Social
Welfare, we first provide an overview of the motivation behind the special issue. We
then highlight the contributions of the six articles that make up this forum and identify
some common themes. We also suggest some reasons why social welfare issues are so
difficult to address in the context of management theory. In addition, we evaluatemeans
of assessing social welfare and urge scholars not to make (or imply) unwarranted
“wealth creation” claims.
Over a decade ago, Walsh, Weber, and
Margolis (2003) lamented the lack of attention to
social welfare issues by management scholars.
Using data ranging from the research topics of
paperspublishedinmajor journals tomembershipin
variousAcademydivisions, theymadeastrongcase
that organizational scholarship had drifted from its
roots—which had emphasized both the social and
the economic objectives of organizations—to focus
overwhelmingly on the economic objectives alone.
Thisdriftwasregrettable, in theirview,bothbecause
it limited the range of intellectual inquiry in organi-
zational studies and because it meant that the find-
ings of organizational scholarship were not being
applied inways thatmight result in better societies.
Two years later, the Academy of Management
Journal (AMJ, 2005) published a special forum on
organizational research in the public interest,
again calling for more consideration of social
welfare in organizational research.
BothWalsh et al. (2003) andmany of the authors
in the AMJ special forum called for an integration
of social and economic objectives. Neoclassical
economists might have suggested that this call
was/is unnecessary. A market-oriented economic
system has been defended from a number of per-
spectives, including the protection of political
freedom through economic freedom, the pro-
tection of property rights, and the honoring of
contractual obligations. But an important foun-
dational justification for the system is based on
utilitarianism, the moral philosopher’s term for
Lynn Stout, originally a special issue editor, also made
contributions to this special topic forum. Judith Edwards con-
tributed several editorial refinements.
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social welfare—sometimes expressed as the
greatest good for the greatest number. More par-
ticularly, a version of market capitalism that
closely approximates neoclassical microeco-
nomic models of perfect competition—for exam-
ple, competition based on price, a laissez-faire
approach to governmental involvement in the
economy, and a profit (or shareholder wealth)
maximization objective for firms—is posited to
produce high levels of social welfare because it
puts society’s resources to their most efficient
uses. In short, social objectives couldbeassured if
economic objectives were attained (Jensen, 2002).
Unfortunately, there are several reasons to doubt
that this relationship is applicable in today’s econ-
omy. First, as we discuss more fully below, the
characteristics of modern market capitalism bear
little resemblance to the conditions underwhich the
perfect competition model assures social welfare.
Thisdivergenceof conditions strongly suggests that
the model’s prescriptions—in particular, laissez-
fairegovernmentalpolicyandashareholderwealth
maximization objective for corporations—are un-
likely to lead us to ever-increasing levels of social
welfare.
A second and related point is that a substantial
number of scholars, practicing managers, and en-
trepreneurs are actively engaged in making the
perfect competition model even less applicable to
thecontemporary economy.Agreatdeal of research
in strategic management—that is, the search for
sustainable competitive advantage—depends on
market conditions that deviate significantly from
those of perfect competition and, in some cases, in-
volve an intention to carve out “mini-monopolies” in
order to obviate competition based on price alone.1
While it may make sense to explore means of
exploiting market frictions to enhance firm profit-
ability or start new ventures, determining whether
social welfare improves is an empirical question;
simply assuming that social welfare is enhanced in
conjunction with improved profits is inappropriate.
Third, it takes a substantial leap of faith to con-
clude that some corporate actions taken to increase
shareholder wealth actually improve social wel-
fare. Consider the case of massive layoffs. These
actions often do result in increases in shareholder
wealth (via stock price increases), but they also re-
sult in substantial hardships—economic, social,
and psychological—for the displaced workers and
for the surviving workers who must take on the re-
sponsibilities of their former coworkers. Thus, it is
not clear that all massive layoffs that enhance
shareholder welfare simultaneously enhance so-
cialwelfare, even in the long run. Indeed, Jonesand
Felps (2013b), using stakeholder happiness as their
measure of social welfare, suggest that society as
a whole may be made much worse off by massive
layoffs, at least in the short run. A similar calculus
could be applied to corporate practices at extreme
ends of a “potential harm spectrum.” Hiring con-
tractors of questionable repute to dispose of haz-
ardous wastes might anchor one end of this
spectrum.Cuttingcostsby increasingwait times for
customer service calls might anchor the other end.
In both cases externality costs (to the environment
and customers, respectively) are incurred and
should be included in social welfare calculations.
Finally, the wisdom of relying on a model that fo-
cuses exclusively on alleviating economic scarcity
no longer makes sense. Throughout much of history,
economic scarcity was a pressing social problem,
andanapproachfocusedonaddressingscarcitymay
have been defensible, despite the social welfare
problems created in its wake. However, now that
material abundance better describes aggregate out-
comes in most developed economies, social welfare
problems, new and ongoing, are less easily dis-
missed. Some of these problems have emergedwith
a vengeance, particularly in the United States—for
example, scandals involving enormous sums of
money, increasing inequality of wealth and income,
underemployment, homelessness among former
members of the middle class as well as the chroni-
cally poor, soaring health care costs, and a political
system closely tied to the vested interests of corpo-
rations and wealthy individuals. Thus, although the
market-oriented economic system has an enviable
record of making its citizens collectively richer, it is
increasingly questionable whether it is capable of
addressing some other urgent social welfare prob-
lems that have emerged from the relationships be-
tween the economy and the rest of society.
Nonetheless, despite calls from scholars repre-
senting a range of disciplines (AMJ, 2005; Walsh
et al., 2003) and the noble vision of the Academy of
Management—“We inspire and enable a better
world through our scholarship and teaching about
management and organizations”—the manage-
ment literature has been remarkably quiet on the
role of managers and corporations in first creating
and now solving the problems that threaten social
1 While lower prices have conventionally been associated
with social welfare, product variety can also be a source of
social welfare benefits (Dixit & Stiglitz, 1977; Spence, 1976).
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welfare. Indeed, little appears to have changed
sinceWalsh et al. lamentedan “eerie silence” in the
management literature with respect to issues of
human welfare at the societal level and urged
management scholars to “bring social welfare back
in” to their research agendas, most importantly by
integrating social and economic objectives (2003:
860; 875). In thisspecial topic forumourobjective is to
help fill this void by encouraging theoretical work
that addresses important social welfare issues re-
lated to the activities of large corporations in the
economy and of those whomanage them. In a later
section we will address the “eerie silence” issue.
NEW APPROACHES TOMANAGEMENT THEORY
AND SOCIAL WELFARE: THEMES
AND CONTRIBUTIONS
In examining the various perspectives taken by
our contributing authors, two themes emerge.
First, fairness and justice are argued to be im-
portant elements of socialwelfare; in otherwords,
utilitarian measures of aggregate well-being—
either economic (e.g., GDP) or human happiness
(e.g., stakeholder happiness)—are not adequate
metrics for social welfare.
In two of the included articles—Marti and
Scherer (2016) and Mitchell, Weaver, Agle, Bailey,
and Carlson (2016)—the authors argue that social
welfare should not be understood in terms of eco-
nomic welfare alone, at least not in terms of ag-
gregate economic wealth (e.g., GDP). Marti and
Scherer address the issue of financial regulation,
beginning with an argument that social welfare is
best seen in terms of three elements: efficiency
(with a long scholarly history), stability (with
a much shorter history), and justice (their main
theme). Mitchell and colleagues make a case for
a pluralistic view of social welfare. In the process,
they find flaws in both economic welfare maximi-
zation (through shareholder wealth maximization;
e.g., Jensen, 2002) and stakeholder happiness en-
hancement (Jones & Felps, 2013b).
Justice, Fairness, and “Many Objectives”
Marti and Scherer (2016) begin by elaborating
on the argument that social science theories not
only describe social reality but also shape it.With
this insight in mind, they raise the vital norma-
tive question, “How should these theories shape
our world?” In their illustrative example these
authors show how financial regulation has, up
to the present, focused primarily on economic ef-
ficiency, with an occasional nod to economic
stability. Building on thework of Habermas (1971),
they argue that social welfare has three major
components: efficiency, stability, and justice.
While stability has clearly taken a back seat to
efficiency (witness the financial meltdown of
2008), in the perspectives of both scholars and
regulators, justice has been given no seat at all.
Marti and Scherer submit that a very important
question should be added to the list of regulatory
concerns: Does the proposed regulation make the
economy more just? For management theorists
this question could be distilled to how the pro-
posed regulation of financial innovations—high-
frequency trading in their example—affects top
incomes and income inequality. In essence, the
authors question whether social welfare is actu-
ally enhanced, irrespective of efficiency im-
provements and stability preservation, if the
great bulk of the benefits flow to those already
well off. Ultimately, theyadvocate an inclusive (as
opposed to a technocratic) approach to financial
regulation, one that focuses on both the ends and
the means of promoting social welfare. Distribu-
tive justice, in the form of income inequality, also
plays a prominent role in Cobb’s (2016) contribu-
tion, discussed below.
Bosse and Phillips (2016) argue that if in our
dominant theory of corporategovernance—agency
theory—wereplacedtheassumptionofnarrowself-
interest with one of self-interest bounded by norms
of fairness, then positive reciprocal behaviors on
the part of managers could be increased and neg-
ative reciprocal behaviors could be reduced. This
change in assumptions could not only enhance our
ability to understand some anomalous agency
theory–based empirical results but also could in-
spire corporate boards to base executive con-
tracts on a well-documented human behavioral
tendency—a quest for reciprocity and fairness—
and achieve social welfare gains through agency
benefits, as well as through the avoidance of de-
structive agency costs based on “revenge.”
Finally, Mitchell and colleagues (2016) address
themetaphysical specter that haunts discussions
of economic welfare—namely, the question of
“one” versus “many.” Having more than one ob-
jective aggravates complexity in decision mak-
ing, and it is not surprising that amajor strengthof
traditional neoclassical economic theory resides
in its use of a single-valued metric—that is,
“happiness” in nineteenth-century utility theory
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and its twin concept, “marginal utility” (measured
through preference rankings and indifference
concepts), later on.
How about the corporation? Do we need a single
yardstick or many yardsticks to evaluate its contri-
bution to social welfare? Jones and Felps (2013a,b)
haveargued that corporateaction requiresasingle-
valued objective that allows managers to make
principled choices among policy alternatives and
that functionsas ananalog to the normativemaxim
that managers should optimize value for the firm’s
equity owners. In contrast, Mitchell and colleagues
maintain that adopting a multi-objective approach
to managerial decision making permits the en-
gagement of a broader array of market-enhancing
preferencesandmarket signalsandallowsamore
inclusive process that enhances multidimensional
social welfare. The authors envision an intra-
corporate “marketplace” inwhichmanagersengage
competing objectives. They argue that invoking
a single-valued corporate objective would only
hamstring the virtuous process of social welfare
enhancement made possible by the existence of
intracorporate markets among stakeholders.
Organizational Processes
Second, several of the authors focus on the
processes by which the twin objectives of eco-
nomic and socialwelfare are enacted. Sonenshein
(2016) explains how the perceived illegitimacy
and equivocality of social issues act as deterrents
to increased corporate attention to activities that
enhance social welfare (beyond economic). Issue
illegitimacy refers to perceptions that allocating
resources to a particular issue falls outside of
a justifiable basis for firm action, whereas issue
equivocality deals with disagreement regarding
the meaning of an issue, including its purpose,
scope, and implications for the firm. In addition,
Sonenshein’s article offers a meaning-making
perspective that unpacks how social change
agents can overcome these impediments through
linking specific tactics (framing, labeling, im-
porting, and maintaining) to different types of
social issues (convertible, blurry, risky, or safe).
The author also explores the multiple levels of
meanings that shape a social issue, including
very macro levels, such as economic philoso-
phies, and verymicro levels, such as individuals’
beliefs. One of themany novel ideas advanced in
the article is that although issue equivocality is
oftenperceivedasan impediment to action, it can
alsoprovideanopportunity for social changeagents
to favorably shape the meaning of a social issue,
thus leading tocorporateactions thatenhancesocial
welfare.
At the firm level, process is also a focus of
Bridoux and Stoelhorst (2016), particularly with
regard to a firm’s relationshipswith stakeholders.
These authors employ relationalmodels theory to
create a hierarchy of relational modes based on
their joint value creation capacity. In the context
of knowledge-based firm/stakeholder endeavors,
communal sharing relationships are shown to be
superior to equality matching, authority ranking,
and market pricing relationships. The choice
among these relational modes is influenced by
stakeholder perceptions of the model that are
made salient by the firm’s behavior. The authors
also argue that there is a tendency towardmarket
pricing when the behavioral standards of the
other modes are not met.
Finally, Cobb (2016) examines employment
processes and how they contribute to, or un-
dermine, social welfare. A central social welfare
concern has been the growth in income inequality
throughout the world. Heretofore, most commen-
tators seeking to understand income inequality
have focused on government policy, technology,
or economic explanations to try to understand the
growth in income inequality. Cobb demonstrates
how scholars of organization and management
can contribute to our understanding of this chal-
lenge. He argues that thewaymanagers structure
the employment relationships in their organiza-
tions is a key factor in producing relative societal
income inequality. His theory contains several
insights suggesting fruitful further research in
management, as well as public policy recom-
mendations. For example, he demonstrates how
the spread of nominally market-focused com-
pensation practices such as pay-for-performance,
external hiring, and pay benchmarking lead to
greater inequality within occupations, and most
starkly within organizations. While management
researchers have long documented the damage
such systems can do to the collaboration on
which organizational performance depends (e.g.,
Lawler, 1971; Pearce, 1987), Cobb draws our
attention to the larger social welfare costs of such
systems. Similarly, he documents how differ-
ent ownership forms (e.g., private equity owner-
ship) drive the management external orientation
that exacerbates income inequality. His work
opens a promising new avenue of management
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research and brings our understanding of orga-
nizations to bear on a central public policy con-
cern in many countries.
We were somewhat surprised that none of the
submissions addressed (1) the role that religion
could play in the relationship between manage-
ment and social welfare, particularly in view of
the recently created Management, Spirituality, &
Religion Interest Group of the Academy of Man-
agement, or (2) possible single-valued corporate
objectives that include a stronger social welfare
orientation (under the assumption that share-
holder wealth maximization [e.g., Jensen, 2002]
and stakeholder happiness enhancement [ Jones
& Felps, 2013b] do not exhaust the possibilities).
In the former case, social welfare is inherently
values based, and religions are inseparably
connected to values. In addition, some religious
organizationspursuesocialwelfare throughmany
types of programs in local communities and
often worldwide, providing potential models for
other organizations, including businesses. In the
latter case, Walsh once called the corporate ob-
jective issue “arguably the most important theo-
retical and practical issue confronting us today”
(2004: 349). In addition, whatever their shortcom-
ings, single-valued objectives do have the benefit
of radically simplifying both management prac-
tice and management scholarship. Furthermore,
multiple corporate objectives could be interpreted
to mean that the pursuit of any one of them is ac-
ceptable or, more cynically, that there is no objec-
tive at all. Given the impetus of this special topic
forum, perhaps future management scholarship
will address these neglected themes.
WHY THE EERIE SILENCE?
As noted above, Walsh et al. (2003) claimed that
there was an “eerie silence” among management
scholars with respect to issues involving social
welfare. If this is still true (and we believe it is), an
important question emerges: Why have manage-
ment scholars made so little progress in address-
ing socialwelfare problemsand,more specifically,
integrating social and economic objectives? Here
we suggest some reasons why this silence exists
and, by extension, why it may emerge again, even
in the wake of this special issue.
First, it is entirely possible that many individual
scholars who populate our discipline believe that
shareholder wealth maximization on the part of
corporations does indeed lead to optimal social
welfare.Althoughnotall of thesescholarsare likely
to be familiar with the details of the logic(s) behind
this theorized relationship (e.g., Jensen&Meckling,
1976; Jones & Felps, 2013a), the shareholder wealth
maximization objective remains appealing for
a number of other reasons. First, as a single-valued
objective, it is simple to articulate and, in theory,
possible to implement (becausemultiple objectives
cannot be maximized simultaneously). Second, it
has a long history of acceptance by managers
and management scholars. Third, it conforms to
themandates of financial markets—that is, “Wall
Street.” Fourth, social welfare issues are often
thought to be the concern of government, not busi-
ness. Fifth, in theory, it renders profit-motivated
activity morally legitimate in utilitarian/social
welfare terms.
In addition, the single-valued shareholder
wealth maximization objective renders manage-
ment theory–based research much more tractable
and, therefore, more attractive to management
scholars. Theories based on economics are cer-
tainly not “value free,”aswasonce claimed, but the
values that underpin them are widely accepted,
meaning that scholars employing them rarely
have to address thorny questions involving
values in their theoretical and empirical work.
Indeed, studies based on economics are highly
amenable to the “scientific method” that con-
veys a great deal of legitimacy and prestige to
many disciplines, including management. The as-
sumptions of economics may not be as realistic as
we might want them to be, but they render the re-
search process much more manageable, a matter
of no small concern to those of us whose careers
depend on doing management research. Finally,
figuring out how to assure that social welfare is
improved in the context of management theory is
very difficult, a topic to which we now turn.
Enhancing Social Welfare in the Economy2
Social welfare is broadly defined in terms of the
well-being of a society as a whole, encompassing
economic, social, physical, and spiritual health.
Although the term social welfare is often defined
2 Some of what follows is based on a utilitarian view of
morality. This view evaluates acts and policies on the basis of
whether theymaximize certainkindsof consequences, usually
couched in terms of “happiness.” Utilitarianism has been
criticized on several grounds, the most prominent of which is
its apparent failure to account for justice—that is, its apparent
willingness to allow the ends to justify the means.
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more narrowly to refer to government programs
that provide assistance to needy individuals and
families, here our reach is longer and comports
with recent efforts to gauge social welfare more
broadly. For example, UN-sponsored rankings of
well-being rate countries on a range of factors,
including economic (e.g., GDP per capita), health
(e.g., healthy life expectancy), social (e.g., social
support), and moral (e.g., generosity and corrup-
tion) dimensions (Helliwell, Layard, & Sachs,
2013). Gallup3 similarly ranks regions by well-
being based on perceived social, financial,
community, and physical health. Our task in
this special topic forum is filling out our un-
derstanding of social welfare writ large by fo-
cusing on the role of the corporate sector.
In theory, there is an array of net benefits—
benefits less costs for each individual—that is
socially optimal. Indeed, there is no reason that
such an optimum could not include concerns
about stability and justice as well as efficiency
(Marti & Scherer, 2016), or even several other di-
mensions of welfare (Mitchell et al., 2016). Practi-
cally, however, such an optimum would be
enormously difficult to achieve even in a static
world. In a dynamic world the slightest distur-
bance would require a new optimal array of net
benefits, rendering its achievement impossible in
all but a theoretical sense.
If we narrow our focus to economic variables
alone, microeconomic theory (specifically, the
first fundamental theorem of welfare econom-
ics) maintains that such an optimum can be
achieved when a competitive equilibrium is
reached. Such an equilibrium is possible only
under conditions of perfect competition—for ex-
ample, markets consisting of many buyers and
many sellers, competition based on price alone,
markets undistorted by government policies,
perfect information, undifferentiated products,
and zero externalities. In equilibrium, a state of
Pareto optimality obtains; that is, no one can be
made better off without making someone else
worse off. The role of the firm in this scenario,
from both practical and moral perspectives,
is simple: firmsshouldattempt tomaximizeprofits.
From a practical perspective, profits are the mea-
sure of firm efficiency and assure firm survival.
Fromamoral perspective, profit-maximizing firms
play their designated role in a “rule utilitarian”
moral system that assures maximal social
welfare (Jones & Felps, 2013a). Thus, the pri-
mary objective of managers is to maximize firm
profits.
Unfortunately, many of the assumptions of
perfect competition—many buyers, many sell-
ers, and so forth—are violated in contemporary
market capitalism and, according to the theory of
the second best (Lipsey & Lancaster, 1956–1957),
all of the assumptions must be met for optimality
to be achieved. Importantly, moving closer to
any one assumption (making it “more true”)—for
example, breaking a large firm into several
smaller firms through antitrust action—does not
necessarily increase, andmay actually decrease,
aggregate social welfare. This means that man-
agement cannot simply maximize shareholder
returns and expect social welfare gains to
emerge; improving social welfare has become
a much more complex and less well-understood
undertaking.
From the perspective of the principal-agent
model taught to most business school students,
complete contracting is assumed and share-
holders are (by construction) the only residual
claimants. However, in our world of incomplete
and implicit contracts, there can be multiple re-
sidual claimants—that is, stakeholders (Klein,
Mahoney, McGahan, & Pitelis, 2012). From this
perspective as well, because managerial de-
cisions can have an impact on multiple stake-
holders, improving social welfare becomes far
more complex than simply maximizing share-
holder wealth.
As compelling as the arguments of Marti and
Scherer (2016) and Mitchell and colleagues
(2016) may be with respect to multiple di-
mensions of social welfare, they further com-
plicate the task of identifying improvements
(let alone optima) in social welfare. Since the
components of social welfare writ large—for
example, efficiency, stability, and justice (Marti
& Scherer, 2106)—are incommensurable (i.e.,
lacking a means of making principled trade-
offs), we cannot deal with multiple dimensions
of social welfare simultaneously, making a so-
cial optimum a destination beyond our reach.
Combined with the futility of pursuing an eco-
nomic optimum—equilibrium under perfect
competition—as discussed here, focusing on
Pareto improvements in aggregate economic
welfare becomes a reasonable approach, albeit
3 Available at http://info.healthways.com/hubfs/Well-
Being_Index/2014_Data/Gallup-Healthways_State_of_Global_
Well-Being_2014_Country_Rankings.pdf?t51449866045324.
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an incomplete one since it ignores questions of
justice (Marti & Scherer, 2016) and intrinsic
values (Donaldson&Walsh, 2015), among others
(Mitchell et al., 2016). We can make someone
economically better off without making any-
one else worse off. Therefore, in the analysis
that follows, incomplete though it may be, we
focus on improvements in aggregate economic
outcomes—Pareto improvements—as our stan-
dard for the improvement of social welfare, as
well as on improvements in firm profitability,
the driving force behind many corporate ac-
tions. We will return to the issue of multiple
measures of social welfare at a later point in the
discussion.
Pareto Improvements and Firm Profitability
As noted above, the term Pareto improvements
applies to exchanges/relationships wherein one
or more parties are made better off without mak-
ing any other party (parties) worse off. Because
oneparty’s gain does not involve another party’s
loss, there is always a net gain, resulting in un-
ambiguous improvements in economic wel-
fare. There are three generic ways to increase
firm profits (along with various combinations
of the three types), each with implications for
social welfare.4 As derived from Figure 1, firms
can (1) increase economic value and price
while holding input costs constant, (2) reduce
input costs while holding economic value and
price constant, and (3) increase/reduce price
while holding economic value and input costs
constant. Under certain conditions, each of
these profit-enhancing actions also enhances
(or at least does not harm) nonshareholder
stakeholders.
Figure 2 presents the components of eco-
nomic cost in somewhat greater detail and
makes explicit the participation of corporate
stakeholders—for example, employees, sup-
pliers, creditors, neighboring communities—in
addition to customers (as recipients of consumer
surpluses) and shareholders (as recipients of
producer surplus). A reservation price is either (a)
themost that a buyer iswilling to pay for a good or
service or (b) the least that a seller is willing to
accept for a good or service. When these prices
overlap, voluntary exchange can occur and, since
few exchanges are made at the reservation price
of either the buyer or the seller, both parties usu-
ally receive surpluses.
Under category 1, firms meet the Pareto im-
provement standard if they (1) develop new
products/services or improve or differentiate
existing products/services (thereby assuring
market disequilibrium) without increasing costs,
(2) raise prices no more than the incremen-
tal economic value added, and (3) appropriate/
capture no more than the incremental surplus
created by price increases and/or increased
volume. New wealth is created and no one
is made worse off. However, if the firm, as-
sumed to have some market power under con-
ditions of disequilibrium, raises prices more
than the incremental economic value created,
then surpluses for continuing customers will
decline, violating the Pareto improvement
standard.
In addition, Priem (2007) outlines a number
of ways that go beyond new or improved
products/services and that allow firms to grow the
FIGURE 1
The Economics of Profit Making (from Peteraf &
Barney, 2003)
4 Note that under equilibrium conditions, firms are price
takers; they have no power to raise or lower their prices. Since
we are dealing exclusively with conditions of economic dis-
equilibrium, firms can raise or lower their prices and will
presumably do so in accordance with the price/quantity re-
lationship of the product/service in question.
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“top line.” Noting that value creation involves
the willingness of consumers to pay more for
a product/service, he describes means of increas-
ing the use value of a product/service so that
the exchange value (price) can be increased,
calling this the “consumer benefit experienced
(CBE)” approach.
Under category 2, with economic value and
price held constant, reductions in input costs
that result from production cost and/or trans-
action cost efficiencies will result in Pareto
improvements as long as the firm does not ap-
propriate more than the savings created. How-
ever, assuming that it has power resulting from
disequilibrium conditions, a firm can also in-
crease its profits by reducing the prices paid to
its input suppliers, resulting in wealth transfers
from the firm’s input suppliers. No newwealth is
created, suppliers suffer losses, and the Pareto
improvement standard is not met. Thus, the
nature of input cost reductions is critical to
the link between profit seeking and wealth
creation.
Under category 3, Pareto improvements can
also be achieved by firms that can increase
profits by reducing prices—an outcome de-
pendent on the price/quantity relationship—
while holding economic value and input costs
constant, thus increasing the consumer sur-
plus of existing customers and adding new
customers. However, firms with power result-
ing from disequilibrium conditions may also
attempt to increase profits by increasing prices.
Even if profits do increase, the losses incurred by
customers result in a failure to meet the Pareto
improvement standard.
Recall that we elaborate on the role of Pareto
improvements because, at the level of discrete
economic transactions/relationships, they rep-
resent the only actions that can be definitively
tied to improved social welfare. Pareto im-
provements do not represent a robust and ex-
haustive representation of social welfare. They
do, however, reveal problems with the share-
holder wealth maximization model and with
the use of the term wealth creation in the stra-
tegic management literature, as discussed be-
low. Since we are not able to identify an ideal
criterion for improving social welfare, we use
one that yields a particular form of better
outcomes.
Externalities
Profitable actions taken by the firms that ei-
ther (1) create positive externalities or (2) create
no negative externalities also result in Pareto
improvements. In economic analyses of social
welfare in the context of shareholder wealth
maximization, the caveat “no negative exter-
nalities” is usually invoked. Negative external-
ities result when losses are incurred by parties
not involved in a given (mutually benefi-
cial) transaction/relationship. The production
of untreated toxic waste as a by-product of
manufacturing processes is an obvious example
of a negative externality. However, if a reason-
ably broad definition of stakeholder is used—
one that includes those affected by corporate
actions (Freeman, 1984)—the caveat involving
negative externalities becomes redundant.
Actions involving Pareto improvements will,
by definition, not harm (and may benefit)
those affected by the firm’s actions—that is,
stakeholders.
Pareto Inferior Actions
In our analysis thus far, we have focused on
Pareto improvements—corporate actions that re-
sult in Pareto superior outcomes. The other side of
the coin is Pareto inferior actions—those that re-
sult in losses for one or more corporate stake-
holders. A short list of Pareto inferior actions
should facilitate an understanding of what we
regard as actions that, at a minimum, are not
FIGURE 2
The Components of Economic Value
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unambiguously socially beneficial and, in some
cases, may be socially harmful:
• employee layoffs or salary/wage cuts;
• reductions in employee benefits—e.g., health
care coverage, pensions, sick leave;
• allowing “normal attrition” to overburden
remaining employees;
• price concessions imposed on suppliers;
• non-price concessions imposed on suppliers—
e.g., delivery schedules, payment terms;
• reduced customer service—e.g., lengthy
waits for poorly trained customer service
representatives, reduced warranty coverage;
• product/service price increases unsupported
by cost increases;
• tax exemptions, zoning relaxation, or in-
frastructure improvements extracted from
local communities;
• environmentally risky resource extraction
practices—e.g., BP’s operations in the Gulf of
Mexico; and
• careless disposal of toxic wastes—e.g.,
tannery wastes in Woburn, Massachusetts,
disposal in countries without protective
regulations.
In short, a number of common corporate ac-
tions intended to increase profits certainly do
not meet the Pareto improvement standard and
may not improve net social welfare. Simply
equating improvements in shareholder wealth
with social welfare improvements (wealth cre-
ation), as is often done in the strategic man-
agement literature (for explicit exceptions see
Klein et al., 2012, and Peteraf & Barney, 2003), is
not justifiable. Unless the profit-improving ac-
tion can be shown to actually improve social
welfare—that is, create new net wealth—no
conclusion to that effect should be drawn or
implied.
Pareto Improvements and Other Elements of
Social Welfare
While the Pareto criterion is assumed to be
applied in aworld in which economic exchanges
are voluntary—if one party does not benefit, he or
she does not make the exchange—power differ-
entials between exchange partners make it
likely that, even if no one loses, the gains of the
powerful will be greater, perhaps far greater,
than the gains of the less powerful. Thus, re-
peated applications of the Pareto criterion could
result in increased concentrations of wealth,
which re-raises the issue ofmultiplemeasures of
social welfare.
Marti and Scherer (2016) deal specifically with
the (distributive) justice aspect of social welfare.
In terms of financial regulation, they argue,
scholars and regulators put far too much empha-
sis on efficiency, too little on stability, and almost
none at all on justice. In fact, a criterion based on
Pareto improvements could be applied to eco-
nomic policy writ large; that is, efficiency (or sta-
bility or justice) should not be improved at the
expense of the other two. For example, regulatory
changes intended to improve efficiency in fi-
nancial markets could not be implemented if
they resulted in less stability in financial mar-
kets or an increase in the Gini coefficient,5
a measure of equality—for example, income,
wealth—in the population. However, given the
economic collapse of 2008 andongoing increases
in concentrations of wealth, we suspect that
many citizens of Western democracies would
sacrifice a fair amount of efficiency for improved
stability. Those in the United States would
probably prefermore egalitarian distributions of
wealth and income as well.
Kaldor Improvements
Situations in which profit-generating corpo-
rate actions do not harm any nonshareholder
stakeholders—Pareto improvements—far from
exhaust the social welfare possibilities, however.
Indeed, opportunities for Pareto improvements
are likely to constitute a relatively small pro-
portion of potential corporate actions. Nicholas
Kaldor (1939) offered one means of extending
Pareto improvements to include actions for which
trade-offs between shareholders and other
stakeholders are required.6 If the benefits antici-
pated by one party are great enough to allow
compensation adequate to “make whole” those
who would be harmed, the policy in question
would be regarded as an improvement in welfare
5 HigherGini coefficientsconnote lessequaldistributionsof
wealth or income; lower coefficients connote greater equality.
Among national economies, most Gini coefficients fall in
a range of 0.20 to 0.50. For example, for OECD countries, over
the 2008–2009 time period, after-tax Gini coefficients ranged
between0.25and0.48,withDenmark the lowestandMexico the
highest. For the United States, the country with the largest
population in OECD countries, the after-tax Gini coefficient
was 0.38 in 2008–2009.
6 Some economists believe that Kaldor’s extension of the
Pareto criterion should be applied only at the macro level
(e.g., governmental regulations). We see no reason that it
cannot be applied at the corporate policy level as well.
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and desirable under Kaldor’s criterion.7 Although
Kaldor’s formulation involves only hypothetical
compensation, it is sufficient to meet the stan-
dards of many forms of utilitarianism—that is,
those that focus solely on aggregate economic
welfare, without regard for the distribution of
harmsandbenefits.As longas the “winners’”gains
exceed the “losers’” losses, utilitarian standards
are met. Thosewhose wealth/income is dependent
on shareholder returnswouldbecome richer owing
to “efficient” (but uncompensated) wealth transfers
from nonshareholder stakeholders, who would be-
come progressively poorer.8
Indeed, repeated applications of the Kaldor
criterion could result in even more rapid in-
creases in concentrations of wealth/income than
repeated applications of the Pareto criterion. Un-
der Pareto, there are no losers; under Kaldor, not
only are there losers but they are uncompensated.
In addition, the Pareto approach has the advan-
tage of being based on voluntary exchanges,
while the Kaldor approach could be highly co-
ercive. Although the Kaldor criterion would seem
to be an improvement on the apparent current
“socialwelfare” criterion (i.e., shareholderwealth
creation is wealth creation) because corporate
actions resulting in reductions in net social wel-
fare are not allowed, the distributive justice im-
plications remain very significant. For these
reasons we do not endorse Kaldor improvements
as an alternative to Pareto improvements.
Perhaps because Kaldor was concerned only
with hypothetical compensation, actual compen-
sation of those harmed by corporate policies—
that is, wealth transfers, externalities—has never
been seriously considered. Nor is it surprising
that such harms do not play a role in attributions
of economic efficiency that accrue to profit-
maximizing corporate behavior. However, the
fact that we rarely calculate the extent of harms
caused by specific corporate policies, let alone
compensate those harmed, does not diminish the
harms themselves. And because the Kaldor cri-
terion is itself fraught with thorny problems both
theoretical and practical (e.g., Layard & Walters,
1978; Sidak & Spulber, 1996; Williamson, 1996), we
cannot endorse a criterion such as Kaldor im-
provements with compensation.9We do, however,
suggest that, given the problems with other
options—equating shareholder wealth creation
withwealth creation/socialwelfare improvement,
Pareto improvements, and Kaldor improvements—
such a criterionmight represent an intriguing line
of inquiry for future exploration,10 but one that is
far too complex to examine with any thorough-
ness here. To sum up, the assessment and mea-
surement of social welfare and, by extension, the
relationship of social welfare to management
theory are not problems for which easy solutions
are apparent.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Themost striking conclusion that can be drawn
from the six excellent articles that make up this
special topic forum and our own examination of
the role of socialwelfare inmanagement theory is
that assessing and measuring social welfare is
a very complex and difficult undertaking. One
theme that emerges from the included articles is
that social welfare cannot be understood in terms
of economicefficiencyalone. Twoarticles (Marti&
Scherer, 2016;Mitchell et al., 2016) directlyaddress
this issue, and a third (Cobb, 2016) addresses it
implicitly. Marti and Scherer (2016) and Cobb
7 What we have called the Kaldor criterion is often referred
to in the economics literature as Kaldor-Hicks efficiency after
Kaldor and John Hicks (1939), who added the provision that
those potentially harmed by an action could (in theory) pay the
potential actor not to proceed with the action.
8 Some commentators (e.g., Hartman, 2006; Smith, 2012) be-
lieve that this process is already well underway.
9 On its face, compensating nonshareholder stakeholders
for wealth transferred to producer surplus (Figure 2) makes no
sense. If producer surplus is used to compensate non-
shareholders for their losses, there is no net gain in producer
surplus. Indeed, this sort ofwealth transfer is a zero-sumgame;
that is, producer surplus increases (approximately) equal
(nonshareholder) stakeholder surplus decreases. It appears
that no new wealth is created. However, when producer sur-
plus (profit) is translated into shareholder wealth, this is no
longer true. Because price/earnings (P/E) ratios for corporate
shares are almost universally greater than 1 to 1 (among S&P
500 firms, P/E ratios averaged from 13.01 to 16.66 in the period
from September 2011 through December 2012 [ycharts.com,
2013]), shareholder wealth gains—share price increases—are
likely to be greater than stakeholder losses, leaving resources
available to compensate harmed stakeholders. Importantly,
compensationmust be paid in company stock. An unpublished
working paper authored by two of the special issue editors of
this special topic forum, entitled “Sustainable Wealth Crea-
tion” (Jones & Freeman, 2013), begins an exploration of this
possibility.
10 To paraphrase Williamson (1996: 1014), to argue that an
approach is flawed does not establish that there is a superior
feasible alternative. All feasible options may be flawed,
and choices must be made from the feasible alternatives
(Williamson, 1996).
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(2016) focus on issues of distributive justice, while
Mitchell et al. (2016) make it clear that there are
multiple values worth preserving. Unfortunately,
assessing social welfare in terms of multiple in-
commensurable measures is well beyond our
current capabilities. As a result, we focused on
economic welfare first and took distributive jus-
tice into account after the fact.
In terms of economic welfare—that is, wealth
creation—alone, we examined three possible
approaches to improving social welfare and
speculated on a fourth. First, we concluded
that the current practice of equating share-
holderwealth improvement with social welfare
improvement—explicitly or implicitly—should
be abandoned in both management theory and
management practice. The assumptions on
which the model that supports this conclusion
is based bear no resemblance to the realities
of twenty-first-century market capitalism. Fur-
thermore, many actions taken by corporate
managers to improve company profits harm non-
shareholder stakeholders of the firm. The
losses must simply be absorbed by these stake-
holders. Indeed, they are rarely, if ever, mea-
sured or counted in calculations of economic
efficiency. For this reason it is likely that some of
these actions do not result in net improvements in
social welfare, and some may actually result in
social welfare losses. Furthermore, in many
cases, because shareholders gain at the expense
of other stakeholders, distributions of incomes
and wealth become increasingly unequal, a dis-
tributive justice concern. Finally, actions taken
under the banner of shareholder wealth im-
provement are fundamentally coercive; that is,
the losses of nonshareholders are not voluntarily
accepted.
The one approach that yields unambiguous im-
provement in socialwelfare, at leastwith respect to
the discrete action under consideration, is the Par-
eto improvement criterion. Making someone better
off without making anyone else worse off does im-
prove social welfare. However, corporate actions
for which there are winners but no losers make up
a relatively small proportion of all such actions,
meaning that the Pareto criterion cannot bewidely
applied. Furthermore, although voluntary eco-
nomic exchanges, by definition, improve the wel-
fare of both parties, differences in bargaining
power may mean that repeated Pareto improving
exchanges lead to increasingly unequal distribu-
tions of income and wealth. Nonetheless, no
coercion is involved in the voluntary exchanges
that underpin Pareto improvements.
Employment of the Kaldor improvement crite-
rion holds the possibility of obtaining actual so-
cial welfare improvements for a full range of
corporate decisions. If winners could (hypotheti-
cally) compensate losers for their losses and still
register gains, social welfare would be improved.
The hypothetical nature of this criterion is a key
element here. As long as no actual compensation
is involved and the gains of the winners exceed
the losses of the losers, the Kaldor criterion is
satisfied. And although greater economic effi-
ciency is achieved, distributions of income and
wealth are likely to become substantially more
unequal. In addition to this distributive justice
concern, Kaldor improvements clearly involve
coercion; losers do not accept their losses
voluntarily.
An approach that we represented as an “in-
triguing line of inquiry for future exploration”
might be called Kaldor improvements with com-
pensation. Because this approach is laden with
thorny theoretical and practical problems, a full
exploration of the prospects for this criterion
would involve an analysis well beyond the scope
of this article. However, other scholars might give
this possibility further consideration, particularly
in view of the fact that shareholder wealth gains
are measured in share price increases, which
grow in proportion to the P/E ratio of the firm’s
stock (usually 10-1 or more) rather than in direct
proportion to stakeholder losses. If this relation-
ship holds, ample resources could be made
available to compensate (in company stock) those
harmed by actions taken to increase shareholder
wealth.
We note that two of the articles included in this
special topic forum appear to be based on Pareto
improvements, the one social welfare criterion
that can be unambiguously linked to social wel-
fare improvement. Bridoux and Stoelhorst (2016)
show that communal sharing firm/stakeholder
relationships are more efficient than other re-
lational modes. Since no other stakeholders ap-
pear to be harmed, the Pareto criterion ismet. The
same conclusion can be reached with respect to
the Bosse and Phillips (2016) article. Introducing
notions of fairness and reciprocity into the con-
tracting process involving the firm’s board and its
top executives could result in reduced agency
losses and possible agency benefits in corporate
governance. No stakeholder group appears to be
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harmed in this revised process, againmeeting the
Pareto improvement criterion.
In terms of the implications of this special topic
forum in general, and of this introduction in par-
ticular, we offer the following. With respect to
management scholarship, Marti and Scherer
(2016) remind us that our theories not only de-
scribe social reality but also shape it. With this
caveat in mind, we strongly urge management
scholars to take social welfare considerations
into account in their theorizing and empirical re-
search. This consideration could take the form of
a thoughtful assessment of the social welfare
implications of their work; relying on the as-
sumption that increasing shareholder wealth in-
variably leads to social welfare advances can
no longer be justified. The same recommenda-
tion applies to practicing managers as well;
Friedman’s (1970: 124) claim that “the social re-
sponsibility of business is to increase its profits”
cannot be taken as gospel any longer. In addition,
we hope that management scholars will be in-
spired to directly address social welfare concerns
in their theory building and empirical studies. If
they do, we need not experience another “eerie
silence” with regard to social welfare issues in
management research once the dust settles on
this special topic forum. And if theories do shape
social reality, as we believe they do, the “better
world” envisioned by the Academy of Manage-
ment may begin to take shape.
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